Probabilistically checkable debate systems (PCDSs) are debates between two competing provers, in which a polynomial-time verifier inspects a constant number of bits of the debate. It was shown by Condon, Feigenbaum, Lund, and Shor that every language in PSPACE has a PCDS in which the debate length is polynomially bounded. Using this result, they showed that the approximation versions of some natural PSPACE-complete problems are also PSPACE-complete.
Introduction

Debate Systems
For many years, debate systems have played an important role in the study of complexity classes (e.g., in [CKS81, LFKN90, Sha92, BFL90, CFLS95]). A debate system is an interaction between two competing, computationally-unbounded debaters, supervised by a computationally-bounded verifier. Debate systems are often equivalently described in terms of alternation or alternating nondeterminism [CKS81] .
In a debate system for a language L, an input x ∈ {0, 1} n is given; the first debater (Player 1) tries to convince the verifier that x ∈ L, while the second debater (Player 0) tries to convince the verifier that x / ∈ L. To this end, the debaters supply a sequence of strings y = (y 1 , . . . , y k(n) ). Here, each y i is of a prespecified length depending only on n; y i is supplied by a prespecified debater type(i) ∈ {0, 1}, and is allowed to depend on y 1 , . . . , y i−1 . ( We assume that k(n), type(i), and the lengths |y i | are all computable in time poly(n). ) Finally, the verifier applies a deterministic predicate V (x, y) to determine an output b ∈ {0, 1}. We say V defines a debate system for L if Player 1 can force b = 1 exactly when x ∈ L. If moreover |y| ≤ poly(n) and V is a polynomial-time algorithm, we say that V defines a polynomial-time debate system for L.
An important parameter is k = k(n), the number of turns in the debate. If k ≥ 1 is a constant, L has a k-round polynomial-time debate system if and only if L lies in the k th level of the Polynomial Hierarchy (i.e., Σ p k ∪ Π p k ), as was essentially shown by Stockmeyer [Sto76] and Wrathall [Wra76] . Chandra and Stockmeyer [CS76] (see also [CKS81] ) showed that when k is allowed to grow polynomially in the input length, polynomial-time debate systems characterize PSPACE: Theorem 1. [CS76, CKS81] A language L has a polynomial-time debate system if and only if L ∈ PSPACE.
Later Shamir [Sha92] , building on [LFKN90] , showed that every language L ∈ PSPACE has an interactive proof -a polynomial-time debate system in which Player 0 plays completely random strings. If x ∈ L, then some Player 1 strategy causes the verifier to accept with probability 1, while if x / ∈ L, any Player 1 strategy causes the verifier to accept with probability at most 1/2.
These results, as well as debate characterizations of other complexity classes, have been instrumental in determining the complexity of many natural computational problemsparticularly 2-player games, which are readily expressed as debates. See [For05] for a fuller discussion of the importance of debate systems in complexity theory.
Probabilistically checkable debates
One of the most significant and surprising discoveries about debate systems is that they retain essentially all of their computational power under severe restrictions on the verifier V .
This discovery has its roots in the study of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) for NP languages. We say that a randomized polynomial-time algorithm V (x, y) is an [r(n), q(n)]restricted probabilistically checkable proof system for the language L (with input x ∈ {0, 1} n and proof string y of length poly(n)), if: 1. For all x ∈ L there is a y with Pr[V (x, y) accepts] = 1; 2. For all x / ∈ L and all y, Pr[V (x, y) accepts] < 1 − Ω(1); 3. V uses r(n) bits of randomness and nonadaptively queries at most q(n) bits of y.
The famous PCP Theorem of [ALM + 98] states that we can provide an [O(log n), O(1)]restricted probabilistically checkable proof system for any L ∈ NP. That is, there exists a special proof format that allows one to efficiently verify membership claims for L, while only looking at a constant number of bits of the proof! An NP verifier for a language L ∈ NP can be viewed in the debate framework, as a debate system consisting of a single turn by Player 1. So, single-turn debates can be made probabilistically checkable with O(1) queries, and it is natural to wonder whether the same can be done for more general classes of debates. To formalize this, let V (x, y) be a polynomialtime verifier, where as before y = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) are supplied by the competing debaters (we assume |y| ≤ poly(n)). Now, however, V uses randomness. We call V an [r(n), q(n)]restricted probabilistically checkable debate system (PCDS) for the language L if: 1. For all x ∈ L, there is a Player 1 strategy that forces Pr[V (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ) accepts] = 1 (note, we insist on perfect completeness);
For all x / ∈ L, there is a Player 0 strategy that forces Pr[V (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ) accepts] < 1 − Ω(1); 3. V uses r(n) bits of randomness and nonadaptively queries at most q(n) bits of y.
How powerful are PCDSs when we allow k to grow polynomially in n, but require q(n) = O(1)? Intuitively, this restriction seems quite severe, since only a constant number of the debate strings y 1 , . . . , y k will receive any queries at all. However, this intuition is deceptive: in [CFLS95] , Condon, Feigenbaum, Lund, and Shor proved that PCDSs are essentially as strong as arbitrary polynomial-time debate systems: Their proof used the PCP Theorem as a building block, along with several interesting new ideas. This result was complemented by several other works that studied various classes of debates; in each case it was shown that restricting the verifier to make O(1) queries to the debate string does not reduce the power of the debates in question. Ko and Lin [KL94] showed that for any k ≥ 1, if L is in Σ p k ∪ Π p k (the k th level of the Polynomial Hierarchy), then there is a k-round PCDS either for L or for L. Condon, Feigenbaum, Lund, and Shor [CFLS97] , in a follow-up to their original work, showed that the interactive proofs in Shamir's result can be made probabilistically checkable; in their PCDSs, the verifier looks at only a constant number of the random bits written by Player 0 as well as a constant number of Player 1's bits. A corresponding result for AM protocols was shown in [Dru10] .
The inapproximability connection
In addition to their inherent interest, probabilistically checkable debates also have a close connection to the complexity of approximation problems. The PCP Theorem (along with its many subsequent refinements) was the key to proving most of the known NP-hardness-ofapproximation results for optimization problems whose decision versions lie in NP. Similarly, Theorem 2 implies that a number of reasonably natural computational problems lying in PSPACE are in fact PSPACE-hard to approximate, as was shown in [CFLS95] . As one simple example, suppose we are given a 3-CNF formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ), and we consider the game in which two players take turns in assigning values to the variables, with x i assigned on the i th round. Player 1 wants to maximize the fraction of satisfied clauses, while Player 0 wants to minimize this fraction. Let Val(G ψ ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the value of this game to Player 1. Using Theorem 1, one can show that it is PSPACE-complete to decide whether Val(G ψ ) = 1. However, from Theorem 2, the authors of [CFLS95] showed that for some constant ε > 0, it is PSPACE-hard even to distinguish formulas with Val(G ψ ) = 1 from formulas with Val(G ψ ) < 1 − ε. 1 While this is a remarkable result, it is not completely satisfactory because the reduction involved, though polynomial-time, causes a large polynomial blowup of the 3-CNF instance sizes. 2 This blowup leads to somewhat weak conditional hardness results. Assume that any algorithm to correctly decide whether Val(G ψ ) = 1 for a 3-CNF ψ of description length n, requires time ≥ T (n) infinitely often ("i.o."), for some time bound T (n) = n ω(1) . Then, Theorem 2 implies that for small enough ε > 0, any algorithm achieving an ε-approximation to Val(G ψ ) has a worst-case runtime T (n a ) on length-n instances, for some explicit absolute constant a < 1.
We note that the reduction in the original PCP Theorem also incurred a similar blowup in parameters. However, in recent work Dinur [Din07, Thm. 8 .1] gave a [log 2 n+log 2 (polylog(n)), O(1)]-probabilistically checkable proof system for length-n SAT instances. This yields much tighter conditional hardness statements for SAT: from an i.o.-lower bound T (n) = n ω(1) on the runtime of algorithms for SAT, we get an i.o.-lower bound of T (n/ log c (n)) on the runtime of algorithms to ε-approximate the maximum fraction of satisfiable clauses in a 3-CNF of description length n (for explicit constants c, ε > 0).
Our result
Our main result is the following quantitative strengthening of Theorem 2, which shows that polynomial-time debates can be made probabilistically checkable in a randomnessefficient way, with a debate string whose size is nearly-linear in the circuit complexity of the original verifier:
Theorem 3 (Main). Suppose L has a polynomial-time debate system with a verifier implementable by polynomial-time-constructible Boolean circuits of size s = s(n) ≤ poly(n). Then L has a [log 2 s + log 2 (polylog(s)), O(1)]-restricted PCDS, with a debate string of total bitlength O(s).
Many natural PSPACE-complete problems, like QBF-SAT (the set of true quantified Boolean formulas, under any standard encoding), have ordinary debate systems with circuits of size s(n) = O(n), and for such problems Theorem 3 yields a PCDS with debate string bitlength O(n) and randomness log 2 (n) + log 2 (polylog(n)). 3 Then using Theorem 3, an i.o.-lower bound T (n) = n ω(1) for determining whether Val(G ψ ) = 1 for 3-CNFs ψ allows 1 The technique is the same as that used to derive inapproximability results for Maximum Satisfiability from PCP constructions.
2 [CFLS95] does not provide an explicit polynomial bound. The bound arising in their work can be brought down somewhat by substituting state-of-the-art PCPs from [Din07] into their applications of PCPs.
However, it appears that following their basic approach to leads to at least a cubic blowup.
3 Actually, for QBF-SAT it is not hard to achieve s(n) = O(n); see [Wil08, p. 1].
us to infer an i.o.-lower bound of T (n/ log c (n)) on the runtime of algorithms to ε-approximate Val(G ψ ), for explicit constants c, ε > 0. We also mention that any language solvable in space S(n) ≤ poly(n) has a polynomialtime debate system definable by uniform circuits of size s(n) = O(S(n) 2 ) [SM73, CKS81]. Thus, for such languages we get a PCDS with debate bitlength O(S(n) 2 ).
The PCDS construction in Theorem 3 has close to the best randomness-efficiency we can hope to achieve (for general L and s), barring a huge algorithmic breakthrough: if the randomness complexity could be brought down to (1 − Ω(1)) log 2 (s), we could use the resulting PCDS for QBF-SAT to solve length-n QBF-SAT instances in time 2 n 1−Ω(1) . Now, it is also natural to wonder whether the debate string in the PCDS of Theorem 3 could always be made to have bitlength bounded in terms of = (n), the bitlength of the ordinary debate-string for L (which may be much smaller than s). Any bound of form poly( ) would be very interesting. However, this seems unlikely. In the theory of probabilistically checkable proofs, the corresponding question is whether satisfiability of q-variable SAT instances can be proved with a PCP of proof-length poly(q); Fortnow and Santhanam showed that this cannot be done unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly [FS11].
Our techniques
To prove Theorem 3, we give a new method for converting standard debate systems into probabilistically checkable ones. The method has two steps. In the first (and more novel) step, we transform a standard debate into one that has a useful "stability" property; in the second step, we transform a stable debate into a probabilistically checkable debate.
Stable debates via error-resilient communication
We say a debate system V (x, ·) for a language L is stable if for any x / ∈ L, Player 0 can not only force V (x, y) = 0, but can even force the debate string y to be Ω(1)-far in relative Hamming distance from any y for which V (x, y ) = 1. (Thus, our stability notion is asymmetric with respect to the players.) The notion of stability was used before, implicitly or explicitly, in several ways in [CFLS95, CFLS97, Dru10] . However, in the previous works building many-round PCDSs [CFLS95, CFLS97] , debates are endowed with a stability-like property 4 in a fairly inefficient way: roughly speaking, on each turn of the debate, the current player is asked to give a description of all previous moves along with their current move. This contributes a quadratic blowup in the overall debate-string length (in addition to blowups at other steps in the transformation).
In our transformation yielding a stable debate, we manage to avoid using such redundancy. We do so by drawing a new connection to interactive coding-the theory of errorresilient two-way communication. Interactive coding was pioneered by Schulman [Sch96] , who showed that any two-party communication protocol can be converted into one that succeeds even in the presence of a noticeable amount of adversarial noise (an adversary that may adaptively corrupt a 1/240 fraction of the bits sent between the two parties). Moreover, this conversion increases the total communication by only a constant factor. Schulman's powerful result seems not to be obtainable from standard tools for resilient one-way communication (i.e., error-correcting codes).
Recently, Braverman and Rao [BR10] gave a new encoding method to achieve the same goal. Their encoding corrects from a much larger fraction of adversarially corrupted symbolsnearly 1/8 if bits are transmitted, or nearly 1/4 if a larger but constant-sized message alphabet is used. More importantly for us, their encoding is somewhat simpler and easier to work with. (We do not know whether the protocol of [Sch96] could also be used to prove our result.)
In our application of interactive coding, we begin with an ordinary debate system for a language L, defined by a verifier V implemented by uniform circuits of size s(n). We then transform V into a second verifier V stab , in which the two debaters are "forced" to encode their debate using the Braverman-Rao encoding. We show that the error-resilience property of the encoding can be used to ensure the stability property of V stab .
But how can we force the debaters to follow the desired encoding? To do this, we construct an auxiliary "encoding-checker" debate system, that allows players to debate whether a communication transcript corresponds to a faithful, noise-free execution of the Braverman-Rao protocol. 5 The encoding-checker debate we construct has two important properties. First, it lasts for only O(1) turns. This is important because an O(1)-turn debate can fairly easily be made stable, by asking for the moves to be encoded in an error-correcting code. With this stable encoding-checker debate in hand, we can make the entire debate stable. (Conceptually, this is the right picture; technically, we make the entire debate stable in one step, rather than first making the auxiliary debate stable.)
The second important property of our encoding-checker debate is that it has a very efficient verifier-one that is definable by a Boolean circuit of size O( ), where is the bitlength of the communication transcript being checked. As a result, our stable verifier V stab can be implemented by a circuit of size O(s(n)) for length-n inputs. This near-linear efficiency is important in the second step of our transformation, in which we make the debate probabilistically checkable.
Achieving these two strong properties in our encoding-checker debate is our main technical challenge. We will return to the issue of how this challenge can be met.
From stable to probabilistically checkable debates
In our second transformation step, we extend our stable debate y = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) by a single, final turn, in which Player 1 gives a "proof" string z purporting to show that V stab x (y) := V stab (x, y) = 1. We then define a verifier V * that, given x, probabilistically checks O(1) bits of y and z. For this proof/verification task, we use a powerful variant of PCPs known as probabilistically checkable proofs of proximity (PCPPs) [BSGH + 06, DR06], applied to the circuit for the stable verifier V stab x . We mention that PCPPs were put to a similar use in [Dru10] , and closely related techniques were used in [CFLS95, CFLS97] .
If x ∈ L, then Player 1 is able to win the stable debate (y 1 , . . . , y k ), so that V stab x (y) = 1, and then some proof z causes V * to accept with certainty. On the other hand, if x / ∈ L, then by stability, Player 0 can guarantee that y is not even close to the set of debate strings for which V stab x = 1. This is precisely the condition in the definition of PCPPs that guarantees that V * will reject with noticeable probability for any setting to z. Thus the probabilistic verifier V * defines our desired PCDS for L.
How efficient is this verifier? The length of the final proof-string z and the randomness complexity of V * are determined by two factors: the efficiency of the PCPP construction we use, and the size of the circuit for V stab x to which we apply the PCPP. We are fortunate in both respects. A very efficient construction of PCPPs is available, due to Dinur [Din07] (building on [BSS06] ); also, our efficient construction of stable debates ensures that the circuit for V stab x is of size O(s(n)). This yields a verifier and debate-string with the properties claimed in Theorem 3.
Building encoding-checker debates
Recall that our approach requires us to build "encoding-checker" debates, to check that a given party's (Alice's) behavior on a communication transcript corresponds to a correct execution of the Braverman-Rao protocol [BR10] for error-resilient communication.
A first complication is that the Braverman-Rao protocol is not even known to have an implementation in polynomial time, let alone nearly-linear time. Like Schulman's earlier protocol [Sch96] , the protocol crucially relies on a special type of codes called tree codes, defined by Schulman. Tree codes have a "distance" parameter, that is loosely analogous to the minimum-distance parameter for error-correcting codes. No explicit construction is known of tree codes with distance large enough to run the protocols of [BR10, Sch96] (see [Bra11] for a recent subexponential-time construction). However, in [Sch96] an elegant probabilistic construction of tree codes was given. Importantly for us, this construction is very randomness-efficient, so that good tree codes exist with succinct representations. This is enough for our purposes: in our debate system, a computationally unbounded debater may succinctly propose a tree code, and establish through debate that it has the needed distance property.
The protocols of [Sch96, BR10] require the communicating parties to decode corrupted tree-code-encoded messages. In the model in which communication is corrupted adversarially (the relevant model for us), it is not known whether this decoding can be performed in polynomial time. However, we are again able to use the power of computationally unbounded debaters, this time to debate the correct values of tree-code encodings and decodings.
We mention in passing that tree codes are not known to be necessary for interactive coding. Indeed, in very recent papers by Moitra [Moi11] and, independently, Gelles and Sahai [GS11] , it was shown that the tree-code definition can be relaxed to a weaker but still-useful kind of object that is easier to construct, yielding interactive coding schemes that are computationally efficient in the random channel-noise model. The papers use dif-ferent relaxations and achieve similar but incomparable results. Achieving efficiency in the adversarial-noise model remains an important open question. Now in the Braverman-Rao protocol, correct behavior for each player is defined relative to some input to the communication task. In our application, the intended input is a playerstrategy in the original debate V for L (Alice is allowed to choose her input/strategy). Such a strategy is an object of exponential size, and cannot even be written down in the encodingchecker debate. Fortunately, any particular execution of the Braverman-Rao protocol only depends on a much smaller portion of the strategy. This crucially helps us, although naively encoding the relevant portion is not succinct enough for our purposes.
The player Alice, while executing the Braverman-Rao protocol, maintains data, and this data needs to be represented in the encoding-checker debate. We are fortunate that the data takes the simple form of a sequence (a 1 , a 2 , . . .) of symbols over a constant-size alphabet, with a i being defined on the i th round of communication and never modified. This allows a debater to succinctly present a global description of Alice's execution. However, a i is defined in a complex way from previous values and from the messages received from Bob. To understand how to efficiently debate the proper settings to a i , we will make a detailed study of a method used by the Braverman-Rao protocol to succinctly describe subsets of edges in a complete binary tree. Our encoding-checker debate system will be built up from a sequence of simpler debates used to reason about this description method and its use in the protocol.
Organization of the paper
Section 2 gives preliminaries that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we show how Theorem 3 follows from an efficient construction of stable debate systems from ordinary ones. In Section 4, we present the necessary background about communication protocols and error-resilient communication, and we define the Braverman-Rao protocol we use.
The next two sections are the heart of the paper. In Section 5, we state our lemma on "encoding-checker" debates for the Braverman-Rao protocol, and use it to build stable debates. In Section 6 we build the needed encoding-checker debates. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude with some open problems.
Preliminaries
Given k ≥ 1, an alphabet Σ, and u, v ∈ Σ k , let ∆(u, v) := {i ∈ [k] : u i = v i } denote the generalized Hamming distance between u and v. We say that
Throughout the paper, when we refer to "uniform" circuit families {C n } n>0 , we mean "polynomial-time constructible": there is an algorithm A that, on input 1 n , outputs a description of C n in time poly(n).
Constraint Satisfaction Problems and Debate CSPs
For k ≥ 1, a k-local Constraint Satisfaction Problem, or k-CSP, over finite alphabet Σ is a collection ψ(x) = (ψ 1 (x), . . . ψ m (x)) of Boolean-valued functions ("constraints") on the input x = (x 1 , . . . x n ) ∈ Σ n , where each ψ j depends only on some k variables of x. Formally, ψ j is specified by a k-tuple I j ⊆ [n] and a truth-table on these k variables. For an assignment x, define Val ψ (x), the value of ψ on x, as the fraction of constraints ψ j which are "satisfied", i.e., for which ψ j (x) = 1.
We use CSPs to define 2-player debates, as follows. A t-turn debate CSP is a CSP ψ(y), whose variables are partitioned into t designated debate-blocks, y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ). The blocks y j may be of unequal size, and each debate-block is designated a "0-block" or a "1-block"; we let type(j) ∈ {0, 1} indicate the type of block y j . (These types need not be strictly alternating.) Note that if k = O(1) and ψ(y) is a debate k-CSP of with m constraints, a natural description of ψ containing its block-information can be given using n = O(m log m) bits, similar to the description length of an ordinary k-CSP. We abuse notation and let "ψ" refer to the formula ψ along with its block-information.
To a debate CSP ψ we associate a turn-based, perfect-information game G ψ between two players, Player 0 and Player 1. In this game, Player 1 tries to maximize the fraction of satisfied constraints, while Player 0 tries to minimize this fraction. On the j th turn, Player type(j) assigns values to the variables in y j . We let Val(G ψ ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of satisfied constraints under optimal play by both players. (This generalizes our definition of Val(G ψ ) for 3-CNFs in the Introduction.)
Debate circuits
One can use circuits to define 2-player debates, similarly to the way we defined debates on CSPs. A t-turn debate circuit is a bounded-fanin Boolean circuit Φ(x, y) with two types of inputs: "start-variables" x, and "debate-variables" y. The debate-variables are partitioned into t designated debate-blocks, y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ). We let type(j) ∈ {0, 1} indicate the type of block y j . If Φ(x) is a debate circuit of size m, a natural description of Φ containing its block information can be given using O(m log m) bits, similar to the description length of an ordinary circuit.
To a debate circuit Φ and any assignment x to the start-variables, we associate a game G Φ [x] between two players, Player 0 and Player 1. On the j th turn, Player type(j) assigns values to the variables in y j . After t turns have been played and all debate-variables have been assigned, Player 1 wins the game if Φ(x, y) = 1, otherwise Player 0 wins. We let Val(G Φ [x]) ∈ {0, 1} denote the winner of this game under optimal play by both players.
PCPPs and error-correcting codes
Following Dinur [Din07] , we will actually give a CSP-based definition of PCPPs. 6 The probabilistic-verifier description of PCPPs (as used in the Introduction) is essentially equivalent to this one.
Say we are given a Boolean circuit C(x) on N input bits, a finite alphabet Σ, and a value β > 0. We assume that {0, 1} ⊆ Σ. We say that a k-CSP ψ acting on variables over Σ is a PCPP for C over Σ with security β if:
1. ψ has variable-set (x, z), where x are the Boolean input variables to C and z are so-called "proof"-variables, taking values over Σ;
2. If C(x) = 1 then there exists a setting of z such that Val ψ (x, z) = 1;
The proof size of ψ is the number of variables in z.
We will use the following efficient construction of PCPPs, due to Dinur: Cor. 8.4 ] There is a constant-size alphabet Σ 0 , a constant β > 0, and a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a description of a circuit C(x) of size t, produces a 2-CSP ψ C (x, z) that is a PCPP for C over Σ 0 with security β. Moreover, the proof size of ψ C and the number of constraints in ψ C are each at most O(t).
Next we review error-correcting codes and the efficiently decodable codes we will use. A (binary) code is an injective map Enc :
Note that such for such a decoder algorithm to exist, the minimum distance of E must be greater than 2ηN .
We will use a family of codes due to Spielman [Spi96] with highly efficient decoders: In Spielman's work, the "decoder algorithm" attempts to output an error-free codeword, rather than a pre-encoded message. Spielman shows how to efficiently recover any codeword that has been corrupted by an η fraction of errors. However, the codes he constructs are systematic, that is, every message x ∈ {0, 1} N appears in a fixed location within its own codeword Enc N (x). Thus from his work, we easily obtain Theorem 5.
Constructing PCDSs from stable debates
In this section we show how to derive the PCDSs claimed in Theorem 3 for the language L, from efficient debate systems for L with the "stability" property described in the Introduction (formally defined in Section 3.2). Subsequent sections will be devoted to constructing these stable debates.
A CSP formulation of the main theorem
We will actually show that stable debates imply an alternative form of our main result, stated in terms of debate CSPs. We will show: Theorem 6. There is a finite alphabet Σ and an absolute constant ε > 0 such that the following is true. Let L be any language with a polynomial-time debate system whose verifier is implementable by uniform Boolean circuits of size s = s(n) ≤ poly(n). Then there is a polynomial-time reduction R that takes as input a string x ∈ {0, 1} n and outputs a debate 2-CSP ψ with variables over Σ. We have:
Moreover, the number of constraints in ψ is at most O(s).
Theorem 3 follows readily from Theorem 6, by a standard technique:
Proof of Theorem 3. Define a PCDS for L as follows. Given an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , the verifier V * applies the reduction R of Theorem 6 to x, yielding a 2-CSP debate ψ(y) with debate-blocks y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ). V * expects the debaters to supply (binary encodings of) assignments to y 1 , y 2 , . . . in turn, where Player type(j) chooses the assignment to y j . V * then chooses a uniformly random constraint ψ i of ψ, queries the assignments to the two variables appearing in ψ i , and outputs ψ i (y) ∈ {0, 1}.
Observe that under optimal play by the debaters, Pr[V * outputs 1] = Val(G ψ ); this equals 1 if x ∈ L, and is less than 1 − ε otherwise. Also, V * makes O(log 2 |Σ|) = O(1) queries to y. Finally, the number of random bits needed to select a random constraint of ψ is at most log 2 c = log 2 s + log 2 (polylog(s)), where c = O(s) is the number of constraints in ψ. Thus V * is the desired [log 2 s + log 2 (polylog(s)), O(1)]-restricted PCDS for L.
Stability and PCDSs
Consider a (deterministic) algorithm V (x, y) with block-information for y defining a polynomialtime debate system for some language L. Fixing δ > 0, say that V (x, y) is a 0-stable debate system with security δ if for all inputs x / ∈ L, there is a Player 0 strategy such that for all Player 1 strategies, the resulting debate string y is at Hamming distance at least δ|y| from any y for which V (x, y ) = 1.
In later sections we will prove the following lemma, implementing "step 1" of the debate transformation described in Section 1.5 of the Introduction:
Lemma 7. There is a δ > 0 for which the following holds. Let L be any language with a polynomial-time debate system whose verifier is implementable by uniform Boolean circuits of size s = s(n) ≤ poly(n). Then there is a 0-stable polynomial-time debate system V stab (x, y) for L with security δ. Moreover, for inputs x of length n, V stab (x, y) is implementable by a uniform circuit C V stab ,n of size O(s log s).
The log-factor arises due to our use of Spielman's quasilinear-size decoder circuits (Theorem 5). If we had a family of binary codes with constant rate, decoded from an Ω(1) fraction of errors by a linear-size circuit family, this would bring the size of C V stab ,n down to O(s(n)), and save a hidden log factor in Theorems 3 and 6. However, it seems to be unknown whether such codes exist.
We now derive Theorem 6 from Lemma 7. (This is "step 2" of our transformation.)
Proof of Theorem 6. Given an input x of length n, let V stab (·, ·) be the 0-stable debate system for L as given by Lemma 7, and C V stab ,n the uniform circuit of size O(s(n)) implenting V stab on length n. Define the specialized circuit
given by Theorem 4, with alphabet Σ 0 . We turn ψ into a debate CSP, by arranging its debate-blocks as follows:
1. First, the blocks of y are assigned Boolean values by the players, exactly as in the debate circuit C V stab ,n (·, ·); 7 2. Second, Player 1 assigns values to z (from the full alphabet Σ 0 ).
We let ψ, with these debate-blocks, be the output of our reduction R. Note, ψ is constructible in polynomial time from x since C V stab ,n is uniform, and ψ has a constant-size alphabet Σ = Σ 0 as needed. We analyze R. First, suppose x ∈ L. Then as V stab is a polynomial-time debate system for L, there exists a Player 1 debate-strategy forcing C V stab ,n (x, y) = 1; call this strategy S 1 . For any Player 0 strategy played against S 1 , the outcome C [x] (y) = C V stab ,n (x, y) = 1 along with property 2 in the definition of PCPPs implies that there exists a z such that Val ψ (y, z) = 1. We conclude that Val(G ψ ) = 1.
Suppose next that x / ∈ L. Then by the 0-stability property of V stab , there exists a Player 0 strategy S 0 that forces y to be δ|y|-far from any y for which C [x] (y ) = 1. In this outcome, property 3 from the definition of PCPPs implies that for any z, Val ψ (y, z) ≤ 1 − βδ. It follows that Val(G ψ ) ≤ 1 − βδ in this case.
Thus conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 6 are met, if we set ε < βδ. Finally, by the efficiency property of Theorem 4, the number of constraints in ψ is at most O C [x] = O (s(n)), as needed. This proves Theorem 6.
Error-resilient communication
In this section we review the definitions of communication protocols and error-resilient communication. We will then carefully describe the Braverman-Rao protocol for errorresilient communication [BR10] . Combinatorial objects called tree codes are central to the Braverman-Rao protocol, and we review their definition as well.
Communication protocols
First we formally define communication protocols. In our application, it is important that the communication protocols we study define the behavior of each party on each possible transcript of previously sent messages, even when these previous messages deviate from the protocol. We will call such protocols total.
In a communication problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, hold inputs x and y respectively from respective domains D A , D B . They wish to evaluate some function f (x, y), which may not be Boolean-valued. To do so, the parties executive a communication protocol, defined next, with the goal that after the protocol's execution both parties know the value f (x, y). We focus on protocols lasting for a predetermined number T > 0 of steps, with a shared, possibly non-Boolean alphabet Σ for the messages. On an odd-numbered step i ≤ T , Alice sends a symbol u i ∈ Σ to Bob; on an even-numbered step i, Bob sends a symbol w i ∈ Σ to Alice.
Formally, we define a (deterministic) T -bit communication protocol P as a pair
consisting of an Alice-protocol P A and a Bob-protocol P B . An Alice-protocol is a mapping
We let u i , w i denote the i th messages of Alice and Bob respectively. The semantics on inputs x, y are as follows: to begin, Alice sends the symbol u 1 := P A (x, λ) to Bob, where λ denotes the empty string. Bob replies with w 1 := P B (y, u 1 ). On step 2i − 1 ∈ {3, . . . , T }, Alice sends the symbol u i := P A (x, u 1 , . . . , u i−1 , w 1 , . . . , w i−1 ); on step 2i ∈ {2, . . . , T }, Bob sends the symbol w i := P B (x, u 1 , . . . , u i , w 1 , . . . , w i−1 ).
Alice and Bob each produce an output after the T th step, which depends on their input and the communication transcript. Formally, Alice's output is given by an evaluation function
Let Eval := (Eval A , Eval B ); we will freely use the term protocol to refer jointly to the pair (P, Eval). We say the protocol computes f if on any inputs x, y, the process above leads both Alice and Bob to output f (x, y).
The pointer-jumping problem
The pointer-jumping problem is a fundamental problem in the study of communication. To describe the problem we need some setup. Fix a T > 0, and let T be the complete binary tree of depth T . The tree T has edge-set X ∪ Y, where X and Y denote the edges at odd and even depths of T respectively. (The depth of an edge e is the length of the path from the root of T ending at the child vertex of e. So, the edges leaving the root are of depth 1, and lie in X .) A subset Z ⊆ X ∪ Y is called consistent, if no two edges in Z share a common parent. For any consistent edge-set Z, there exists a unique vertex in T of maximal depth, reachable from the root by a path contained in Z; we let v(Z) denote this vertex.
In the pointer-jumping problem, Alice receives as input a maximal consistent subset X ⊆ X ; that is, every vertex with outgoing edges in X has exactly one outgoing edge in X.
PJ T is computable by a T -bit communication protocol. Also, it is easy to see that any function f (x, y) computable by a T -bit communication protocol is reducible (in a natural sense) to PJ T : there exist a pair of mappings m A , m B where (X, Y ) = (m A (x), m B (y)) is a valid input to PJ T , and such that the value f (x, y) can be determined from PJ T (X, Y ).
Faithful behavior in communication protocols
Suppose that (P, Eval) is a 2T -bit protocol to compute some function f (x, y), using messages in alphabet Σ. Let x ∈ D A be an input to Alice. Say that the tran-
That is, Alice behaves according to P A (x, ·) under the message-sequence w from Bob (even though Bob might not be following the protocol correctly). Say that the transcript (u, w) is
Similarly, given y ∈ D B , say that (u, w) is P B -faithful for y if P B (y, u 1 ) = w 1 and, for
If the transcript (u, w) is both P A -faithful and P B -faithful, we call it a perfect execution of P.
Error-resilient communication
We consider the scenario in which messages sent between Alice and Bob are sometimes corrupted in transmission. Define a noisy transcript as a 4-tuple (u, u , w, w ) ∈ Σ 4T . The interpretation is that Alice sends the sequence of symbols u = (u 1 , . . . , u T ), but they are received by Bob as the corrupted sequence u = (u 1 , . . . , u T ); similarly, Bob sends the sequence w, and Alice receives the corrupted sequence w .
Let f be a function on domain D A × D B . A very desirable property of a communication protocol for f is that the protocol succeeds in computing f (x, y) whenever the number of transmission errors is not too large; that is, each of Alice and Bob can deduce the value of f (x, y) from their own part of the input, along with the sequence of corrupted messages received. Formally, let (P, Eval) be a 2T -bit communication protocol for f . Say that the evaluation rule Eval is resilient for f with respect to inputs x, y ∈ D A × D B and noisy
That is, Alice and Bob both succeed in evaluating f correctly when they apply their evaluation functions to their actual sent messages, and their corrupted received messages. Note, there is no assumption here that Alice and Bob are following P.
Say that (P, Eval) is δ-error-resilient for f if for any x, y ∈ D A × D B , Eval is resilient for f with respect to x, y, and any noisy transcript (u, u , w, w ) satisfying
That is, whenever Alice and Bob both follow the protocol P, and the total fraction of transmission errors is at most δ, both players succeed in evaluating f (x, y) correctly.
Braverman and Rao proved the following result: They prove Theorem 8 for the case where f is the pointer-jumping problem, f := PJ T , from which the result for general f follows easily. Their result improves on an earlier result of Schulman [Sch96] , who defined error-resilient communication protocols and gave a similar result, sending binary messages and tolerating a 1/240 fraction of transmission errors.
(In [BR10] the authors also construct (1/8 − ε)-error-resilient protocols using binary messages. The protocols from Theorem 8 will be easier for us to use, however.) The quantitative improvement in the more recent work is not needed for our work, but the algorithmic details of the Braverman-Rao protocol make it easier to apply.
Sensibleness
Related to error-resilience is a property of communication protocols we call sensibleness. Similarly for y ∈ D B , define the possible outcomes for Bob with respect to y as P oss B (y) := {s ∈ S : ∃x ∈ D A such that f (x, y) = s}. We say that P A is sensible with respect to some S ⊆ S if, for any input x ∈ D A to Alice and any transcript (α, β) that is P A -faithful with respect to x, we have
That is, no matter how much Bob deviates from the protocol (or has his messages corrupted in transmission), Alice will never produce a guess s for f (x, y) that lies in S , unless that guess is consistent with some value y that might be held by Bob.
We define sensibleness for P B with respect to S analogously. We say P is sensible with respect to S if P A , P B are both sensible with respect to S . When we define it in Section 4.8, we will observe that the Braverman-Rao protocol has a useful sensibleness property.
Tree Codes
A d-ary tree code of depth n and alphabet Σ is defined by an encoding function C :
The definition can be interpreted as follows. A sequence (v 1 , . . . , v k ) defines a path of length k ≤ n in the complete, rooted, directed d-ary tree of depth n (call this tree T ): we begin at the root, and on the j th step of the path, we follow the outgoing edge index by v j . We may view C as a labeling of the edges of T : namely, C(v 1 , . . . , v k ) gives the label of the final edge followed on path (v 1 , . . . , v k ), and C(v 1 , . . . , v k ) ∈ Σ k gives the full sequence of labels seen along this path.
Given
where w is the closest common ancestor of u and v. We say the tree code C has distance µ > 0 if for all k ≤ n and u, v ∈ [d] k , we have In the protocols we study, tree codes are intended to be decoded in the presence of errors. Given C as above, and given an arbitrary string σ = (σ 1 , . . 
as the message u whose encoding is closest to σ. In case of ties, D breaks ties nondeterministically; for the application of the tree codes in the Braverman-Rao protocol, such nondeterministic decoding suffices to give the desired behavior. However, to promote clarity we will work with a deterministic refinement of the decoder: we define
as the lexicographically smallest u that minimizes ∆ C(u), σ .
The following theorem on the existence of tree codes was proved by Schulman in [Sch96] , where the tree code and analysis given are attributed to collaboration with Rabani and Goldreich.
Theorem 9. [Sch96, Lemma 1B] For every µ ∈ (0, 1) and n > 0, there is a d-ary tree code C = C µ,n of distance µ for depth n, with alphabet size |Σ| = O d,µ (1).
The code C µ,n in [Sch96] is constructed probabilistically. No explicit construction is known; however, this will not be a major obstacle for our purposes, since we are working with computationally unbounded debaters. We will, however, need some constructive properties of the code. To establish these properties, we review the definition of the code from [Sch96] .
To define C µ,n , we fix a prime number p ≥ d, and a sequence r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) of elements of the finite field F p . We take Σ := F p , and define a code C (r) : [d] ≤n → Σ by the encoding rule
(1) is large enough, then the above code is a tree code of distance µ, for some "good" choice of (r 1 , . . . , r n ). Importantly for us, such a code requires only O d,µ (n) bits to specify.
Edge encodings for the Braverman-Rao protocol
A central ingredient in the pointer-jumping protocol of Braverman and Rao (specifically, the protocol that appears in [BR10, Section 5], with which the authors prove Theorem 8) is a method of encoding consistent subsets of the edges of a complete binary tree T of depth T > 0. In this subsection we describe the encoding method. While we follow [BR10] closely, we will also introduce a few new notations.
The tree T has edge-set X ∪ Y, where X and Y are the edges at odd and even depths of T respectively. (The depth of an edge e is the length of the path from the root of T ending at the child vertex of e. So, the edges leaving the root are of depth 1, and lie in X .)
Given an edge e ∈ X ∪ Y and a sequence h ∈ {0, 1} >0 , we define
as the final edge visited if we start at the child vertex of e, then following the path described by h. For example, edge(e; 0) is the left edge out of the child vertex of e. If, in either case, the path described by h is ill-defined (because we hit a leaf node of T with additional steps left to take), we set edge(e; h) := ⊥. We also define edge(∅; h) similarly to edge(e; h), except we start our walk at the root vertex of T . where P(X ∪ Y) denotes the set of subsets of X ∪ Y. For a = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ Π k , we will define a sequence e 1 , . . . , e k of edges of T ; some e i 's may remain undefined, an outcome we will indicate by [e i = ⊥]. Each e i will be determined by a 1 , . . . , a i . Then, we take
Following [BR10, Section 4], we inductively define the edges e i for i = 1, . . . , k. Given a ∈ Π k , let a i = (r i , s i ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R} × {0, 1} ∈{1,2} . (The idea is that r i is a pointer to a r i .)
1. If r i = 0, define e i := edge(∅; s i ).
2. If r i < i and e r i = ⊥, set e i := edge(e r i ; s i ).
3. If e i = ⊥, and there is no j < i for which e j , e i have a common parent, set e i := e i .
Otherwise, set e i := ⊥.
Next, following [BR10, Section 5], we build on the mapping E to give a second encoding of consistent edge-sets, where edge-sets are now to be encoded by sequences over the constantsized alphabet Γ := {<, 0, 1, >, ∅}.
We again fix some R > 0. We also fix some binary encoding of elements of Π, which we'll denote desc : Π → {0, 1} * . desc is selected so that the description desc(( , s)) is at most c 0 log bits long, for each ( , s) ∈ Π and for some fixed
The definition of z i given below may appear mysterious; the basic idea is that the encoding rule makes it possible to encode a value z i = (r i , s i ) ∈ Π with r i < i, using a string w that is short whenever r i is not too much smaller than i. This allows the Braverman-Rao protocol to make progress quickly.
For i = 1, . . . , k, we define z i ∈ Π as follows:
1. First suppose (γ 1 , . . . , γ i ) is of form (γ , <, w, >), where γ ∈ Γ * and w ∈ {0, 1} * . In this case let j < i be the index immediately preceding the substring w, so that γ j = "<" and γ i = ">".
If, additionally, w = desc(( , s)) for some ( , s) ∈ Π, then set z i := (max{j − , 0}, s).
In this case we say that i is a viable index for γ.
2. If either of the two conditions in part 1 are not met (i is not viable), set z i := (i, 00).
Using this definitions, we define a second mapping 9
by the rule E (γ) := E(z(γ)).
Note that from the definition of the edges e 1 , . . . , e k defined by z(γ), it follows that e i = ⊥ whenever i is not a viable index for γ. However, some viable indices i for γ may still have e i = ⊥. If e i = ⊥, we say that i is an effective index for γ.
The Braverman-Rao protocol
We are now ready to define the Braverman-Rao protocol that we will use in our work (following [BR10, Section 5]). This is the error-resilient protocol (P BR,ε , Eval ε ) used to prove Theorem 8 for the case where f = PJ T is the pointer-jumping problem.
The protocol proceeds in R = O(T /ε) rounds, where each round i consists of a message α i ∈ Σ sent by Alice to Bob, followed by a message β i ∈ Σ sent by Bob to Alice. (We will define Σ = Σ ε shortly.) We let α, β ∈ Σ R denote the sequences of messages sent by Alice and Bob. As the protocol is designed to be error-resilient, it is helpful to state the behavior of the two parties as determined by a (possibly-corrupted) sequence of received messages. We will use α i ∈ Σ to denote the possibly-corrupted i th message received by Bob, and β i to denote the i th message received by Alice.
Recall the tree codes C (r) from Section 4.6. We will apply these codes to sequences over the alphabet Γ (so, d = 5). We take n := R, µ := 1 − ε, and let p = O ε (1) be an appropriately large prime number. Then we fix any "good" sequence r ∈ F R p , i.e., one such that C (r) : Γ ≤R → F p is a 5-ary tree code of distance 1 − ε. Let D lex (r) be the deterministic decoding function for C (r) , as defined in Section 4.6. We set Σ := F p .
In the protocol, Alice will maintain a sequence (a 1 , a 2 , . . .) ∈ Γ * , as well as a sequence A 1 , A 2 , . . . of subsets of X ∪Y. The values of a i , A i will be defined on the i th round and be used to determine Alice's i th message α i . Similarly, Bob will maintain sequences (b 1 , b 2 , . . .) ∈ Γ * , and B 1 , B 2 , . . . ⊆ X ∪ Y, with b i , B i defined on the i th round. We define these sequences first; the protocol will then be simple to state.
Specifically, we define 10
and similarly, we set
Observe that A i is indeed computable by Alice at and Bob respectively at the beginning of round i, since a 1 , . . . , a i−1 and b 1 , . . . , b i−1 are held by Alice and Bob respectively at that time.
For any (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , β 1 , . . . , β i−1 ), the set A i is the union of a consistent subset of X with a consistent subset of Y; so A i is itself consistent. Similarly, B i is consistent. Thus, the vertices v(A i ), v(B i ) are each well-defined (recall the definitions from Section 4.2). 10 The definition is equivalent to the one in [BR10] , but stated slightly differently. In particular, whenever a 1 , . . . , a i−1 are produced according to the Braverman-Rao protocol (under any amount of noise in the communication channel), we always have E (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 ) ⊆ X and so intersecting with X is unnecessary. However, we wish to have a version of the protocol whose behavior is well-defined on all sequences (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 ) ∈ Γ i−1 .
We also differ slightly from [BR10] in that we work with the tree-code decoding function D lex from Section 4.6. This does not affect correctness of the protocol, since D lex is a deterministic refinement of the original decoder.
Next, the symbol a i ∈ Γ is defined in terms of (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , A i ), by the rule below. The definition appears complicated, but the idea is simple: if v(A i ) = v(A i ∪ X), Alice is trying to encode the edge e ∈ X that will extend the path in A i . She can't do this in one step, since e takes several bits to encode; so, she extends the encoding one symbol at a time. Here is the formal definition:
, let e be the edge of X whose parent is v(A i ). Now inspect the form of (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 ). First, suppose it is of form (u, <, w) where u is of some length j − 1 ≥ 0, and such that:
(a) w ∈ {0, 1} * is a (possibly empty) prefix of a string w = desc(( , s)), for some ( , s) ∈ Π; and,
is the root of T , = j, and edge(∅; s) = e; or, e is a descendant of e j− = e j− (a 1 , . . . , a j− ), with e j− ∈ X and e = edge(e j− ; s). 11
In this case, set a i so as to extend w according to w (or, if w = w , let a i := ">"). 12
is not of the form described in item 2, set a i := "<".
The definition of b i for Bob is perfectly analogous; moreover, this definition is not even needed for our work. However, we state it below for completeness:
, let e be the edge of Y whose parent is v(B i ). Now inspect the form of (b 1 , . . . , b i−1 ). First, suppose it is of form (u, <, w) where u is of some length j − 1 ≥ 0, and such that: In this case, set b i so as to extend w according to w (or, if w = w , let b i := ">").
is not of the form described in item 2, set b i := "<".
Now we can state the protocol.
Protocol P BR,ε : For i = 1, . . . , R:
1. Alice transmits α i := C (r) (a 1 , . . . , a i );
Bob transmits
Evaluation functions Eval ε = (Eval A , Eval B ):
Alice outputs Eval
In [BR10] it is shown that (P BR,ε , Eval ε ) is an (1/4 − ε)-error-resilient protocol for PJ T , when C (r) is a tree code of distance 1 − ε. However, note that the protocol is at least welldefined for any setting of r ∈ F R p . (This is useful since in our debate systems, the debaters will have to supply the values of r themselves, and they may provide values that do not yield a good tree code.)
The output of both players' evaluation function in P BR,ε is always some vertex of T . Recalling the definition of sensibleness from Section 4.5, we have:
Claim 10. The protocol (P BR,ε , Eval ε ) defined above is sensible with respect to the set S consisting of all leaf vertices of T .
Proof. We show sensibleness for Alice with respect to S ; Bob is handled similarly. It is not hard to see that for any sequence β ∈ Σ R , the set A i ∩ X = E (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 ) ∩ X is always contained in X for each i ∈ [R]; this is because, when following P A , Alice only encodes edges of X with a 1 , . . . , a R . It follows that the vertex Eval A (X, α, β) = v(A R ) is always reachable by some path P in T whose intersection with X is contained in X. Thus if v(A R ) is a leaf vertex v, we must have v ∈ P oss A (X). So P A is sensible with respect to S .
Building stable debate systems
In this section we state our technical lemma (Lemma 11) on the existence of "encodingcheckers" for the Braverman-Rao protocol, and use it to prove Lemma 7 from Section 3.2, completing the proof of Theorem 6. Lemma 11 will be proved in Section 6.
Debate circuits for the Braverman-Rao protocol
Our main technical tool is Lemma 11 below, which exhibits a family of constant-turn debate circuits. Given a sequence r and communication transcript (α, β), this debate allows the players to debate whether Alice is faithfully following the Braverman-Rao protocol in (α, β) with respect to C (r) , with a "good" choice of r.
Remark.
In our work with debate circuits, we will frequently use a space-saving shorthand. We sometimes say that a debate circuit Φ takes as part of its start-variables an input sequence h ∈ S ≤t , for some alphabet S and parameter t ≥ 1. More formally, the actual input is a binary representation of a sequence h ∈ (S ∪ {⊥}) t , where we choose any fixed-length binary representation of the alphabet S ∪ {⊥} and use a concatenated encoding for h . The debate circuit Φ expects h to be of the form {S} k × {⊥} t−k , for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}. In Lemma 12 of Section 6.1, we will show that there is a linear-sized circuit that checks that h is of this form, and also computes the value k.
The debate circuit Φ will be understood to output 0 if h is not of the expected form. Similarly, we will often design debate circuits in which some Player b ∈ {0, 1} is asked to give a sequence h ∈ S ≤t . The implicit understanding is that Player b is expected to supply a sequence h ∈ S k × {⊥} t−k for some k ≤ t. The debate circuit tests this condition, and immediately outputs 1 − b if it is not satisfied. Thus, we may assume that under optimal play by both players, the sequences supplied are of the expected form.
Lemma 11. Fix any ε ∈ (0, 1/4) with finite binary expansion, and let p = O ε (1) be chosen as in Section 4.8. For T > 0, let R = R T,ε = O(T /ε) be as in Section 4.8, and let Σ = Σ ε = F p . Given a sequence r ∈ F R p , let
be the protocol defined in Section 4.8 relative to tree code C (r) and parameter T (we suppress the dependence on r in our notation). 2. There exists a maximal consistent set X ⊂ X , for which (α, β) is P A -faithful with respect to X;
3. The set X meeting condition 2 can be chosen to satisfy Eval A (X, α, β) = vertex(∅; h).
Also, Φ BR,ε T has O(1) debate-blocks, is of size O ε (T ), and is constructible in time poly ε (T ).
We will only need to apply Lemma 11 for one arbitrary choice of ε ∈ (0, 1/4), but proving it for all ε in this range presents no extra difficulty.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Let V (x, y) be a verifier defining a polynomial-time debate system for L. By assumption, for length-n inputs, V can be implemented by a uniform circuit C V,n of size s(n).
By modifying the debate for C V,n , we may ensure that the debate-blocks y 1 , . . . , y k are strictly alternating between the players and consist of a single bit each, with Player 1 getting the first block (type(1) = 1). We do this by padding the debate with irrelevant bits as necessary; this doesn't affect the debate length or the efficiency of the verifier by more than a constant factor. 13 Let T = T n ≤ O(s(n)) be the number of turns used by the modified debate circuit C V,n . Let ε := 1/8; let p be a sufficiently large prime and let R = R T,ε = O(T ) be as in Section 4.8. Let N = O(T ) be defined as the total size of the circuit Φ BR := Φ BR,ε T from Lemma 11. Let Enc N : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} N be the code given by Theorem 5 (we have N = O(T )), and η > 0 the constant from that Theorem. We can encode and decode messages of variable length m ≤ N/2 under Enc N , by simply fixing a 2-bit encoding of {0, 1, ⊥}. In doing so, we will abuse notation and regard Enc N as a mapping from {0, 1} ≤N/2 → {0, 1} N , and similarly will regard Dec N as a mapping from {0, 1} N → {0, 1} ≤N/2 . Often when we apply Dec N , we will have an "expected" length of the decoded message; if the actual decoded message is of a different length, the implicit convention is that we will either truncate it or pad it with arbitrary values to get a message of the desired length. (The intention here is that, by encoding messages of various lengths with the same codeword length N , we make them "count equally"; this will help us to establish the 0-stability property.)
Our debate system V stab (x, ·) works in phases, as follows:
Phase 1: Player 1 is asked for a stringr ∈ {0, 1} N . (Player 1's implicit claim is that r = Enc N (r) encodes some sequence r ∈ F R p for which C (r) is a tree code with distance ≥ 1 − ε = 7/8. We have chosen N large enough that a sequence r ∈ F R p can be so encoded.) Next, V stab computes r := Dec N (r), as well asr := Enc N (r). If ∆(r,r ) ≥ ηN /2, then V stab immediately outputs 0. Otherwise, we proceed to Phase 2.
Phase 2: The players are asked to write down binary descriptions of symbols (α 1 , β 1 , . . . , α R , β R ) ∈ Σ 2R in that order, where each α i is written by Player 1 and each β i is written by Player 0. Let (α, β) := (α 1 , . . . , α R , β 1 , . . . , β R ).
Next, Player 1 provides a stringĥ ∈ {0, 1} N . (The implicit claim here is that Player 1 was following P A for some maximal consistent input X, and that Eval A (X, α, β) = vertex(∅; h), where h ∈ {0, 1} ≤T andĥ = Enc N (h).)
V stab computes h := Dec N (ĥ), as well asĥ := Enc N (h). If ∆(ĥ,ĥ ) ≥ ηN /2 then V stab immediately outputs 0. Otherwise, we proceed to Phase 3. V stab computes trans := Enc N ((α * , β * )). If ∆( trans, trans ) ≥ ηN /2, then V stab immediately outputs 0. 14 Next, if ∆ Σ ((α * , β * ), (α, β)) ≥ R/100, then V stab immediately outputs 0. Otherwise, we proceed to Phase 4.
Phase 4:
Let v denote the debate variables for Φ BR , and let (v 1 , . . . , v k ) be the debateblocks of v in their order of assignment (Lemma 11 tells us that k = O(1)). For j ∈ [k], let type(j) ∈ {0, 1} be the player who gets to assign v j in the debate circuit Φ BR .
In Phase 4, the players provide stringsv 1 , . . . ,v k ∈ {0, 1} N , in that order, with Player type(j) providingv j . (The idea is that the players are to be encoding an execution of the debate Φ BR .) V stab computes v j := Dec N (v j ) for each j ∈ [k], as well asŵ j := Enc N (v j ).
If for some j we have ∆(v j ,ŵ j ) ≥ ηN /2, then let j 0 be the minimal such value; V stab immediately outputs 1 − type(j 0 ). Otherwise, we proceed to Phase 5.
Phase 5: V stab evaluates Φ BR applied to start-variables r (as produced in Phase 1) along with (α * , β * , h) (from Phase 2), and with the assignments (v 1 , . . . , v k ) to the debate-variables produced in Phase 3. Let b ∈ {0, 1} denote the output of Φ BR . If b = 0 then V stab immediately outputs 0. If b = 1, V stab outputs 1 if either of the following two conditions hold:
(i) The sequence h ∈ {0, 1} ≤T is of length less than T ;
(ii) h is of length T , and C V,n (x, h) = 1.
If neither of (i), (ii) holds, V stab outputs 0.
This completes the description of the verifier V stab . First we will analyze the efficiency properties of V stab ; then, we will show it has the desired 0-stability property. For efficiency, V stab can certainly be implemented in polynomial time, since Φ BR , Enc N , Dec N all have uniform circuits (and N, T = O(s) ≤ poly(n)). But observe that V stab can also be implemented as a uniform circuit of size O(N ) = O(T ), given oracle access to circuits Φ BR , Enc N , Dec N , C V,n . (The only significant computation required is to compute Hamming distances, and we will show in Section 6.1 that this can be done by linear-sized circuits.) Since Φ BR , Enc N , Dec N are all computable by uniform circuits of size at most O(T ) ≤ O(s(n)), and the (modified) circuit C V,n is uniform of size O(s(n)), we conclude that V stab is implementable by a uniform circuit C V stab ,n of size O(s(n)) as required.
We now argue that V stab defines a 0-stable debate system for L, with security parameter δ = Ω(1) to be determined.
First, suppose x ∈ L. Then the debate C V,n (x, y) can be won by Player 1, with some strategy S 1 . Recall that C V,n has a debate consisting of T strictly alternating 1-bit turns, with Player 1 playing first. Let T be the complete binary tree of depth T . We may view S 1 as a consistent subset of X , the odd-depth edges of T : namely, for (h 1 , . . . , h 2k+1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2k+1≤T , the condition edge(∅; (h 1 , . . . , h 2k+1 )) ∈ S 1 means that, if the first 2k variables of the debate y 1 , . . . , y 2k have been assigned as h 1 , . . . , h 2k , then the strategy S 1 directs Player 1 to set y 2k+1 := h 2k+1 . If necessary, we can extend S 1 to be defined on every sequence h 1 , . . . , h 2k+1 , so that S 1 is a maximal consistent subset of X . Note, this expansion doesn't alter the fact that S 1 is a winning strategy.
Define a Player 1 strategy S 1 for V stab (x, ·), as follows:
1. In Phase 1, provide an encodingr = EN C N (r) for some r ∈ F R p for which C (r) is a tree code with distance 7/8. Such an r exists for our sufficiently large setting of p. Note, this guarantees that we reach Phase 2.
2. In Phase 2, faithfully execute the Alice-protocol P A defined relative to C (r) , with S 1 ⊂ X used as Alice's "input." (Recall that P A 's behavior is well-defined for any behavior by Bob in setting the values of the sequence β.) After (α, β) have been defined, setĥ := Enc N (h), where h ∈ {0, 1} ≤T satisfies Eval A (X, α, β) = vertex(∅; h).
Note that we will reach Phase 3. N ((α, β) ). Thus, we have (α * , β * ) = (α, β), and we reach Phase 4.
In Phase 3, set trans := Enc
4.
In Phase 4, simulate an optimal Player-1 strategy for the debate Φ BR , with startvariables r, α, β, h as defined previously. If in the simulation type(j) = 1 and the simulated Player 1 strategy wants to set v j := u j , we setv j := Enc N (u j ). If type(j) = 0, then to obtain a Player 0 move for the simulated Φ BR -debate turn j, Player 1 looks atv j and decodes to the closest codeword encoding some valid assignment u j to v j , using u j as the simulated move by Player 0.
(Phase 5: there is nothing for either player to do.)
We now argue that S 1 is winning for V stab . Consider any strategy used by Player 0 against S 1 . In Phase 2, S 1 follows P A faithfully with respect to S 1 . Now, P A is sensible with respect to the set S of leaf vertices of T (Claim 10). Also, S 1 is winning for C V,n (x, ·). Thus, the resulting value Eval A (S 1 , α, β) = vertex(∅; h) is either (i) a non-leaf vertex, or (ii) is a leaf vertex for which C V,n (x, h) = 1.
In Phase 4, Player 1's honest behavior in the previous phases implies that properties 1-3 of Lemma 11 all hold. Also, Player 1 always encodes valid moves in Phase 4, so he is not punished at this stage. Since he is following an optimal strategy, Player 1 wins his own simulated debate in Phase 4.
If any movev j by Player 0 in Phase 4 (type(j) = 0) is at distance ≥ ηN /2 from a valid codeword, V stab will output 1 in Phase 4. So assume the contrary. Then, for the Player-0 moves u j used by Player 1 in his simulation in Phase 4, we have u j = Dec N (v j ) = v j . That is, the moves used by Player 1 in his own simulation are exactly those used by V stab in evaluating Φ BR in Phase 5. Thus in Phase 5, b = 1 (if we do not output 1 already in Phase 4). Also, our analysis of Phase 2 implies that one of conditions (i)-(ii) from Phase 5 holds. Thus, V stab outputs 1. So V stab (x, ·) is winnable by Player 1 in this case, as needed.
Next, suppose x / ∈ L. Then the debate V (x, ·) can be won by Player 0 with some strategy S 0 . As before, we can regard S 0 as a consistent subset of edges in T , this time a maximal consistent subset of Y.
Define a Player 0 strategy S 0 for V stab (x, ·), as follows:
1. Phase 1: there is nothing for Player 0 to do. If Player 1 passes Phase 1, let r ∈ F q p be as computed by V stab in this phase.
2.
In Phase 2, faithfully execute the Bob-protocol P B defined relative to C (r) , with S 0 ⊂ Y used as Bob's "input." (P B 's behavior is well-defined for any partial setting by Alice to α.) 3. (Phase 3: nothing for Player 0 to do.) 4. In Phase 4, simulate an optimal Player 0 strategy for the debate Φ BR , with startvariables r, α * , β * , h as defined previously. The simulation and resulting settings to v j (with type(j) = 0) are carried out analogously to the process in step 4 of the strategy S 1 defined earlier.
Now consider any Player 1 strategy played against S 0 . Let z ∈ {0, 1} M denote the complete resulting debate-string, where M denotes the debate-string length for V stab ; we have M ≤ Kn for some constant K > 1. We set δ := η/(100K) = Ω(1). Let z ∈ {0, 1} M be any string at Hamming distance at most δM from z; we will show that V stab (x, z ) = 0. This will establish that V stab is a 0-stable debate system for L with security δ, as needed.
For any debate-variable (or set of variables) u for V stab , we let u [z] , u [z ] denote the assignments to u under z, z respectively. We define
Note that if ∆(r [z ] ,r [z ] ) = ∆(r [z ] , Enc N (r [z ] )) > ηN /2, then V stab (x, z ) outputs 0 on Phase 1. On the other hand, if ∆(r [z ] , Enc N (r [z ] )) ≤ ηN /2 (we may assume this holds), then ∆(r [z] , Enc N (r [z ] )) ≤ ηN /2 + δM < ηN . Now, Dec N decodes from an η fraction of errors, so we then must have r [z] 
Similarly, in Phase 2 on (x, z ), either V stab outputs 0 or else we have h [z] = h [z ] ; and in Phase 3 on (x, z ), either V stab outputs 0 or else (α * , β * ) [z] = (α * , β * ) [z ] . In each case we assume the latter outcome.
In Phase 4 on (x, z), all of Player 0's assignmentsv j [z] (with type(j) = 0) are valid encodings of assignmentsv j
It follows that in Phase 4 on (x, z ), the verifier V stab cannot punish Player 0 by outputting 1.
Having established this, we can now conclude that, unless V stab (x, z ) outputs 0 in Phase 4, we must have v j
[z ] = v j [z] for all j ∈ [k] with type(j) = 1. This is shown by the same argument we used to get r [z] = r [z ] ; we may assume the equality holds for each such j. We also draw attention again to the fact that v j
If r [z] = r [z ] defines a tree code C (r) of distance < 7/8, then condition 1 in Lemma 11 is violated by (r, α * , β * , h) [z] , and for the debate defined by Φ BR we have
Now in S 0 , Player 0 follows an optimal strategy in this debate, and (v 1 , . . . , v 
So suppose now that r [z] does define a tree code of distance ≥ 7/8. We distinguish two further cases:
Case 1: (α * , β * ) [z] is not P A -faithful. In this case, on (x, z), Player 0 wins the debate Φ BR with the start-variables (r, α * , β * , h) [z] , and the settings (v 1 , . . . , v k ) [z] ; i.e., in Phase 5 we have b [z] = 0. Then Player 0 also wins the same debate on (x, z ), by the equalities in Eq. (3). Thus V stab (x, z ) = 0.
Case 2: (α * , β * ) [z] is P A -faithful, with respect to some Alice-input X. In this case, let us return our attention to Phase 3. On (x, z ) , the second test in that phase implies that, for Player 1 to avoid losing in Phase 3, we must have
Now, examine the noisy transcript 15 (α * , α, β, β * ) [z] ; by our work above, it has fewer than 2(1/4 − ε)R transmission errors. The transcript (α * , β * ) [z] is P A -faithful with respect to X, and by the definition of S 0 , the transcript (α, β) [z] is P B -faithful with respect to Bob-input S 0 . As P BR,ε is (1/4 − ε)-error-resilient, we conclude that
(This is the first and only time we use the error-resilience property of P BR,ε .)
The value P J T (X, S 0 ) is a leaf vertex of T , since X, S 0 are maximal consistent subsets of X , Y; we have P J T (X, S 0 ) = vertex(∅; h * ) for some h * ∈ {0, 1} T . Also, because S 0 is a winning strategy for C V,n (x, ·) for Player 0, we have C V,n (x, h * ) = 0. Now, there are two options for Player 1's behavior in the debate V stab (x, z): either he supplies anĥ [z] that decodes to the "correct" value h [z] = h * , or he supplies anĥ [z] that decodes to some other value h [z] = h * . In the first option, V stab (x, z) must output 0 in Phase 5 since conditions (i), (ii) of Phase 5 are violated by h [z] . In the second option, Player 0 can and will win the debate Φ BR on (x, z), as condition 3 in Lemma 11 is violated by the start-variables (r, α * , β * , h) [z] . In either event, V stab (x, z) = 0. But then in either event, we also have V stab (x, z ) = 0, due to the equalities in Eq. (3).
Combining Cases 1 and 2 above, we conclude that V stab (x, z ) = 0, as was to be shown. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Building encoding-checker debates
In this (fairly lengthy) section we prove Lemma 11 from Section 5.1.
Some functions computable by linear-size circuits
We will build up the debate circuits of Lemma 11 from simpler component debates. In all the debate circuits we construct, we will use certain basic circuits as building blocks. These building blocks are collected in the next lemma.
Lemma 12. Let S be a finite set, and fix some standard binary encoding of S ∪ {⊥}. The following functions can be computed by uniform circuits of size O(n):
Output: the value v k ∈ S.
(ii) Input: A string x ∈ {0, 1} n ;
Output: ||x|| 1 , the number of 1s in x. Proof. We describe the circuit constructions; in each case the uniformity follows by inspection. (i): Assume, by padding if necessary, that n = 2 t for some t ≥ 0. Also, it will be most convenient to assume that v is indexed as v = (v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) and that k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}.
If n = 1, then k = 0 and we output v 0 . Otherwise, define v ∈ S n/2 by the rule
Which of the two cases we are in can be determined by looking at the most significant bit of the binary representation of k. Thus, v j can be determined with reference to O(1) bits of v and k. Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n/2 − 1} be the number obtained from k by deleting the most significant bit of k. Then observe that v k = v k . Using a circuit of size O(n), we have reduced from an instance of problem (i) with parameter n, to a single instance of problem (i) with parameter n/2. Iterating this procedure for log n steps reduces us to the base case n = 1, which we solve directly. The total circuit size is O s≤log n n2 −s = O(n).
(ii): Again we may assume that n = 2 t for some t ≥ 0. Create a full binary tree T of depth t, whose leaf nodes are the bits of x. Then ||x|| 1 is the result if we place an integer addition gate at each non-leaf node of T , and output the value at the root.
The addition gates at distance s ≤ t from the leaf nodes take as inputs two integers in the range {0, . . . , 2 s−1 }, which may be represented by bitstrings of length s. Addition of two s-bit numbers can be implemented by a circuit of size O(s), and there are 2 t−s = 2 −s n additions to perform at level s. Thus the total contribution to the circuit size at level s is O(s2 −s n). Summing over s ≤ t = log 2 n, the total circuit size is O(n), since s>0 s2 −s < ∞. 
Then p i can be computed from v i , v i+1 by a circuit of size O(1). We can express the desired bit b as b = i∈[n−1] p i , allowing us to compute b with a circuit of size O(n).
Next, for j ∈ [n] let x j := [v i ∈ S]. Letting k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} be the value desired in problem (iv), we have
Using our value b and our circuit from part (ii), we can compute k in size O(n).
Debate circuits to check tree-code encodings and decodings
The following lemma gives debate circuits to verify encodings under the tree codes C (r) defined in Section 4.6. The lemma applies, not just to a "good" choice of r ∈ F n p (i.e., one that yields the tree-code distance property claimed in Theorem 9), but to any setting of r.
Lemma 13. Fix any d > 1 and a prime p ≥ d. For each n, there exists a uniform debate circuit Φ n , that takes as its start-variables a 3-tuple
We have Val(G Φn [r, u, s]) = 1 iff C (r) (u) = s. Also, Φ n has 2 debate-blocks and is of total size O(n).
Proof.
Rather than building the debate circuit Φ n gate by gate, we describe the debate on a high level and argue that it can be implemented in size O(n).
First, using part (iv) of Lemma 12, Φ n checks that u, s are of equal length as sequences. If this test fails, Φ n immediately outputs 0. Otherwise, suppose both are of length k ≤ n; Φ n retains the value k for future use. Next, Player 0 is asked to name a value k * ≤ k for which he claims C (r) (u 1 , . . . , u k * ) = s k * . In support of his claim, Player 0 is also asked to provide a sequence r ∈ F k * p , for which he claims r = (r k * , r k * −1 , . . . , r 1 ). Using the value k * , Φ n checks that k * i=1 (u i − 1)r i = s k * over F p . If this check fails, Φ n immediately outputs 1. Otherwise, Player 1 is given a chance to challenge Player 0's claim that r = (r k * , r k * −1 , . . . , r 1 ). To do so, he names a value k ∈ [n]. The debate circuit then outputs 1 iff k ≤ k * and r k = r k * +1−k .
Correctness of the debate follows immediately from the definition of C (r) ; also, Φ n has 2 debate-blocks by construction. As for its efficiency, we just need to perform addition of ≤ n terms over a field of constant size; compare, add, and subtract (log n)-bit numbers; and access the elements r k , r k * +1−k . The first two tasks are easily performed by a circuit of size O(n), and for the third we use Lemma 12, part (i).
The next lemma gives two debaters a way to debate the claim that a sequence q ∈ F k p decodes to u ∈ [d] k under the code C (r) , using the deterministic decoder D lex (r) .
Lemma 14. Fix d > 1 and a prime p ≥ d. For each n, there exists a uniform debate circuit Λ n , that takes as its start-variables three sequences
We have Val(G Λn [r, q, u]) = 1 iff D lex (r) (q) = u. Moreover, Λ n has O(1) debate-blocks and is of total size O(n).
Proof. First, using Lemma 12, part (iv), Λ n checks that q, u are of equal length k ≤ n as sequences; if not, Λ n immediately outputs 0. Otherwise, we retain the value k.
In the first debate-block, Player 1 gives a sequence s ∈ F ≤n p , claiming that C (r) (u) = s. This claim is then debated using the debate circuit Φ n of Lemma 13. If Player 1 loses this debate, Λ n immediately outputs 0. Thus we may assume from now on that Player 1 provides an s satisfying C (r) (u) = s.
Next, Player 0 is given a chance to name values v ∈ [d] ≤n , s ∈ F ≤n p for which he claims both of the following hold: The players debate each of these conditions; Λ n outputs 0 if Player 0 wins both debates, otherwise Λ n outputs 1. By definition of D lex (r) , then, the debate is winnable by Player 0 iff D lex (r) (q) = u.
To debate condition 1, we use the debate circuit from Lemma 13, except that we now reverse the roles of the players in that circuit. For condition 2, the Hamming distances involved can be computed using Lemma 12, part (iii). The lexicographic comparison in condition 2 can be performed by an O(n)-sized circuit using a simple idea: by recursively comparing the first half of s with the first half of s , and the second half of s with the second half of s , we can determine whether s < s. Thus we have |Λ n | = O(n), and Λ n has O(1) debate-blocks.
Debate circuits for edge encodings
Next, we give efficient debate circuits that allow debaters to argue about the properties of specific edge-sets specified by the mapping E defined in Section 4.7. Recall that Γ is the constant-sized alphabet used as inputs to E , and that elements of Π = {0, 1, . . . , R} × {0, 1} ∈{1,2} are encoded by a mapping desc : Π → {0, 1} ≤c 0 log R .
Our ultimate goal in this (long) subsection will be to prove the following technical lemma, which allows players to debate which edges are specified by an encoding over Γ * . Our first step is the next lemma, which allows the players to debate which indices of a sequence γ are viable.
Lemma 16. There exists a uniform debate circuit Υ R that takes as start-variables sequences γ ∈ Γ ≤R , i ∈ [R], and w ∈ {0, 1} ≤ c 0 log R . We have Val(G Υ R [γ, i, w]) = 1 iff i is a viable index for γ, and w is equal to desc(z i ), where z i = z i (γ). Υ R has a single debate-block, and is of size O(R).
Proof. First, Υ R checks that i is at most the length of γ, and that w = desc(a), for some a ∈ Π. The string w is O(log R) bits long, and this test can be performed by a circuit of size O(log R), since we're using a "reasonable" encoding function desc. If either test fails, Υ R outputs 0. If both tests pass, we store a ∈ Π as well as the length |desc(a)|.
Note that if the tests above pass, then condition 2 in the Lemma holds iff
for some γ ∈ Γ * . Next, Player 0 is given a chance to provide a value t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |desc(a)|+ 1} for which either: As the next step towards proving Lemma 15, we introduce an auxiliary encoding function
E is defined similarly to E from the last subsection, except that E is more "permissive" about allowing edges into the collections it defines. For a = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ Π k , we define a sequenceẽ 1 , . . . ,ẽ k of edges of T , some of which remain undefined (ẽ i = ⊥). We take
Let a i = (r i , s i ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R} × {0, 1} ∈{1,2} . Inductively, for i = 1, . . . , k, defineẽ i as follows:
1. If r i = 0, letẽ i := edge(∅; s i ).
2. If r i < i andẽ r i = ⊥, letẽ i := edge(ẽ r i ; s i ).
By analogy with E , we also define a mapping E : Γ ≤R → P(X ∪ Y) by E (γ) := E(z(γ)).
Although E (γ) is a larger set than E (γ), the edges {ẽ i } still hold useful information about E (γ), and the mapping E is simpler for the players for debate about than E . We collect useful facts about E in the next few lemmas. Lemma 17 below gives a debate circuit to debate edges encoded by E . 
Proof.
We collect some observations about E before describing the the debate circuit. Let z(γ 1 , . . . , γ k ) = (z 1 , . . . , z k ), and for i ∈ [k], if z i = ⊥, let z i = (r i , s i ) ∈ Π. Observe that e i = ⊥ iff there is a sequence 1 ≤ j 1 < . . . < j t = i of viable indices for (γ 1 , . . . , γ k ), where:
If these conditions are met, then we say that (j 1 , . . . , j t = i) is an i-chain. Observe also that if (j 1 , . . . , j t = i) is an i-chain, thenẽ i is obtained from the concatenated path s j 1 . . . s jt :
Using this observation, the main part of the debate proceeds in two main phases, as follows.
Phase 1: First, Player 1 provides a sequence 1 ≤ j 1 < . . . < j t of indices, which he claims is an i-chain. The sequence (j 1 , . . . , j t ) is presented in the form of a string w ∈ {0, 1} R , where w = 1 encodes that is part of the chain. In the remainder of Phase 1, Player 0 is given an opportunity to challenge the claim that w encodes an i-chain. He is allowed to choose one of three ways of doing so, corresponding to the three possible ways that w may fail to encode an i-chain:
Option 1: Player 0 may name a value > i, claiming that w = 1 (so that w cannot encode a proper i-chain); or, Player 0 may claim that w i = 0. Either type of claim can be tested using part (i) of Lemma 12.
Option 2: Player 0 may claim that r j 1 = 0. To do this, he first provides a value ≤ R for which he claims that w = 1 and w = 0 for all < (so that = j 1 ). The debate circuit may directly check that w = 1; the claim that w = 0 for all < can be challenged by Player 1, who is given a chance to provide a counterexample value .
If Player 0 passes this check, Player 0 then is asked to support his claim that r = 0. To do this, Player 0 may either claim that z = ⊥, or that z = (r , s ) where r = 0. In either case, the claim can be evaluated using the debate circuit Υ R from Lemma 16 (with roles assigned appropriately).
Option 3: Player 0 can argue that in the sequence (j 1 , . . . , j t ) encoded by w, some value t ≤ t fails condition 2 in the definition of an i-chain. Note that such a value t exists exactly if there are indices < such that:
2. for all ∈ { + 1, . . . , }, w = 0; 3. Either is not a viable index for (γ 1 , . . . , γ k ), or is viable but r = .
In Option 3, Player 0 is asked to provide indices < satisfying 1-3 above. Each condition can be tested efficiently by Ψ R : for the first condition we use part (i) of Lemma 12; for the second condition we ask Player 1 to provide a counterexample ; for the third condition, we apply the debate circuit Υ R from Lemma 16.
If Player 0's challenge (using one of Options 1-3 above) succeeds, then Ψ R outputs 0. Otherwise, we consider Player 1 to have established that w encodes an i-chain, and we proceed to Phase 2. Observe that Player 1 can withstand Player 0's challenge (under optimal play) exactly if w does encode an i-chain. Therefore, we will assume in the next phase that Player 1 does provide an i-chain (so in particular we haveẽ i = ⊥), and successfully defends his claim.
Phase 2: Player 1 is asked to support his claim thatẽ i = edge(∅; h). To do so, he first provides a sequence x ∈ {0, 1} 2R . For ∈ [R], the variables (x 2 −1 , x 2 ) are "intended" under honest play to be set to (0, 0) if w = 0. If w = 1, the intention is that they are set to (1, 0) if s is of length 1, and set to (1, 1) if s is of length 2. Player 0 is given an opportunity to challenge Player 1's assignment to x, using debate circuit Υ R from Lemma 16. If Player 0's challenge succeeds, Ψ R outputs 0. Thus, we may assume x is set honestly by Player 1. Note that in this case, ||x|| 1 is equal to the depth ofẽ i in T .
Next, Ψ R uses part (ii) of Lemma 12 to compute ||x|| 1 and compare it to j, the length of h. If ||x|| 1 = j, thenẽ i and edge(∅; h) are of different depths and cannot be equal; in this case, Ψ R outputs 0. Otherwise, Player 0 is given a chance to argue thatẽ i and edge(∅; h) are specified by different paths in T . To do this, Player 0 provides a value q ∈ [j], claiming that the two edges' defining paths differ at depth q-one follows an edge in T labeled "0", the other follows an edge labeled "1".
The value h q , giving the behavior of the path specifying edge(∅; h) at depth q, can be computed in O(R) size using Lemma 12, part (i). To compare this to the q th bit specifying e i , Player 0 is asked to provide a string w ∈ {0, 1} R . Ψ R expects w to be a prefix of w, followed by 0s, with at least one 1 in w . It tests this condition (easily done in O(R) size), outputting 1 if the test fails; so we may assume that Player 0 supplies such a prefix, with * ∈ [R] denoting the last 1-index in w . (Player 0's implicit claim here is that * is the i-chain index for which z * = (r * , s * ) determines the q th step in the path specifyingẽ i .)
Player 0 is also asked to provide a string z , intended to be a description of z * under desc. The accuracy of the description z can be tested using the circuit Υ R from Lemma 16, so assume it is correct. In particular, we have access to the string s * ∈ {0, 1} ∈{1,2} .
Using w , the debate circuit computes a string x ∈ {0, 1} 2R , where (x 2 −1 , x 2 ) := (x 2 −1 , x 2 ) if w = 1, (0, 0) else.
Note that x can be computed from x and w in O(R) size. Also note that under our assumption on the forms of w and of x, the Hamming weight ||x || 1 equals the depth D of the edgeẽ * . The debate circuit expectsẽ * to determine the q th edge of the path specifying e: namely, it expects that D − |s * | < q while D ≥ q. The circuit Ψ R tests this condition, outputting 1 if the test fails. If the test succeeds, the q th bit of the path specifyingẽ i can be determined from the values D and s * , and compared to h q . Ψ R outputs 0 if these bits differ, and outputs 1 otherwise. Assuming honest play by Player 1 in Phases 1 and 2 (which we've argued is an optimal strategy), Player 0 can win exactly if he can give an index q for which h q differs from the q th step specifyingẽ i . This is possible iff edge(∅; h) =ẽ i . Thus Ψ R has the desired behavior. Also, by construction it has O(1) debate-blocks, and is of O(R) size as needed.
The next two lemmas relate the mappings E and E .
Lemma 18. Fix γ ∈ Γ ≤R , and suppose that i is an effective index for γ (that is, e i = ⊥). Then,ẽ i = e i .
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. The base case is immediate from the definitions. Assume the statement holds for all i < i, and suppose e i = ⊥. Then z i = (r i , s i ) where r i < i and e r i = ⊥. By inductive assumption,ẽ r i = e r i . Then from the definitions of e i ,ẽ i it follows that the two are equal, as claimed. (c) there is no i ∈ I with i < i, for whichẽ i has the same parent vertex in T asẽ i .
For every j /
∈ I, at least one of conditions (a), (b), (c) above fails for i := j.
Proof. First, suppose that indeed I = {i : i is an effective index for γ}, and consider any i ∈ I. Conditions 1.(a) and 1.(b) follow immediately from the definitions. Also, given i ∈ I with i < i, Lemma 18 tells us thatẽ i = e i andẽ i = e i , so condition 1.(c) must hold as well. So condition 1 is true for I. Now consider any j / ∈ I, which by assumption is a non-effective index (for γ, implicit from now on); we show one of conditions (a), (b), (c) must fail for i := j. Suppose that (a), (b) hold for j: that is, j is viable, and z j = (r j , s j ) where r j < j and either r j = 0 or r j ∈ I is effective.
Assume r j ∈ I; the case r j = 0 is handled similarly. Now for e j = ⊥ to hold (as it does), it must be the case that e j is defined ( = ⊥), but shares a parent vertex with some e j = ⊥ for which j < j. (For otherwise, we would have e j = e j .) Then j is an effective index, and by Lemma 18,ẽ j = e j .
Consult the definition ofẽ j : it is obtained by starting from the child vertex ofẽ r j (= e r j , since r j is an effective index), and taking the steps described by s j . Now, e j is obtained by taking the steps s i starting from e r j , so in fact e j =ẽ j . Thusẽ j shares a common parent withẽ j , so condition (c) fails for j. Thus, condition 2 is true for I.
For the converse direction, suppose I = {i : i is an effective index for γ}, and let ∈ [k] be the minimal index for which the equality fails. Let us first suppose that is an effective index but / ∈ I. Then by definition, is viable (so, condition (a) holds for i := ). Let z = (r , s ). If r = 0, then condition (b) holds for . On the other hand, if r > 0, then r must be an effective index, with r < . By the minimality of , it must be the case that r ∈ I. Thus condition (b) holds for whether or not r = 0.
The fact e = ⊥ implies that e has no common parent with e , for any effective index < . But by Lemma 18, e =ẽ , and so for any effective < ,ẽ has no common parent with e =ẽ . Thus condition 2.(c) holds for . Since each of conditions (a)-(c) hold for i := but / ∈ I, condition 2 fails for I. Suppose now that , the minimal index chosen earlier, is in I but is not effective. If condition (a) or (b) fails for i := , we are done, so assume that is viable, r < , and either r = 0 or r ∈ I. By minimality of , r < is an effective index: e r is defined. Then for e = ⊥ to hold (as it does), e must share a parent vertex with some edge e where < . By Lemma 18, we have e =ẽ ; also, arguing as in a previous case, we find that e =ẽ . Thusẽ shares a parent vertex withẽ , and condition (c) fails for ∈ I. Thus condition 1 fails for I. This completes the proof.
We can now prove Lemma 15.
Proof of Lemma 15. The debate proceeds in phases.
Phase 1: The circuit computes k ≤ R, the length of γ. Player 1 is asked to give a set I ⊆ [k] which he claims is the set of effective indices for γ. The set I is specified by a sequence x ∈ {0, 1} k . Now we use Lemma 19 to debate Player 1's claim. Player 0 is asked to give, either an i ∈ I for which one of conditions (a)-(c) in Lemma 19 fails, or an i / ∈ I for which (a)-(c) all hold. By Lemma 19, such an i can be found iff I is not the set of effective indices for γ.
For the index i chosen by Player 0, it can be checked whether the index lies in I or not using Lemma 12, part (i). First suppose that i ∈ I. Then the players debate in turn whether each of conditions (a)-(c) in Lemma 19 hold for i, with with Player 1 attempting to argue that each of these conditions do hold. Call these three sub-debates Debate (a), Debate (b), and Debate (c). We will explain how Debates (a)-(c) are to be implemented shortly. Ψ R outputs 0 if Player 1 loses any of Debates (a)-(c). Otherwise the debate moves on to Phase 2 below.
If, on the other hand, i / ∈ I, then the players again debate whether each of conditions (a)-(c) hold for i, this time with Player 1 attempting to argue that each of these conditions do not hold. Ψ R outputs 0 if Player 1 loses all of these (role-reversed) Debates (a)-(c). Otherwise the debate moves on to Phase 2.
As for the implementations of Debates (a)-(c), a debate subcircuit of size O(R) for Debates (a) and (b) can be defined using Lemma 16. For Debate (c), suppose that for b ∈ {0, 1}, Player b wishes to argue that condition (c) in Lemma 19 fails for i. To do so, he is asked to name an i ∈ I with i < i, for which he claimsẽ i ,ẽ i have the same parent vertex. He then gives representations g, g for which he claims e i = edge(∅; g),ẽ i = edge(∅; g ).
(5) Ψ R may easily verify in O(R) size that i ∈ I, i < i, and that the edges defined by g, g share a parent. The claims in Eq. (5) above may then be debated in O(R) size, using Lemma 17. Thus Phase 1 can be implemented in O(R) size. Lemma 19 implies that, under optimal play by Player 0, Player 1 can reach Phase 2 iff he sets I = I(x) as the set of all effective indices for γ. In Phase 2 we will assume that he does so.
Phase 2: Player 1 specifies an index i * ∈ I (this membership claim can be easily tested, so assume it holds). He claims that the edge e i * , determined by γ, satisfies e i * = edge(∅; h).
(6)
The claim that Eq. (6) 
Characterizing faithful behavior in the Braverman-Rao protocol
Our next lemma will give a useful alternative characterization of faithful behavior in the protocol P BR,ε of Section 4.8. We focus on characterizing faithful behavior for Alice (an analogous characterization holds for Bob, but we don't need it). First we need some notation.
In that protocol, we defined the set A i in terms of the sequences a 1 , . . . , a i−1 and β 1 , . . . , β i−1 ; let A i = A i a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , β 1 , . . . , β i−1 denote the rule defining A i in Eq.
(1). This rule implicitly depends on the choice of tree code C (r) used (but is well-defined for any r ∈ F R p ). Note, the rule A i does not depend on Alice's input X. Note also that we can apply the rule A i to arbitrary sequences from Γ i−1 × Σ i−1 ; the resulting set A i ⊆ X ∪ Y will always be consistent, since the mapping E always outputs consistent sets.
We also defined a i in terms of A i , a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , and the input X. An important observation, however, is that the dependence on X is very limited. Namely, given A i , the rule defining a i depends only on one question about X: and note the definition is consistent since X is a consistent set. Then, we can express the definition of a i in the protocol of Section 4.8 as a rule of form
Formally, a i = a i (C, c 1 , . . . , c i−1 , θ) takes as inputs any consistent subset C ⊂ X ∪ Y, any sequence c 1 , . . . , c i−1 ∈ Γ i−1 , and a θ ∈ {0, 1, ⊥}. Modifying the protocol statement appropriately, the output of a i is defined as follows:
1. If θ = ⊥, let a i := "∅".
2. Else, if v(C) has outgoing edges from X , let e be the θ-outgoing edge of v(C). Now inspect the form of (c 1 , . . . , c i−1 ). Suppose it is of form (u, <, w) where u is of some length j − 1 ≥ 0, and such that: In this case, set a i so as to extend w according to w (or, if w = w , let a i := ">").
3. Else, set a i := "<".
Our next lemma uses the mappings A i and a i to characterize faithful behavior for Alice in P BR,ε .
Lemma 20. Let P BR,ε = (P A , P B ). The transcript (α, β) is P A -faithful, if and only if there exists a pair of sequences a = (ã 1 , . . . ,ã R ) ∈ Γ R , (θ 1 , . . . , θ R ) ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} R , such that the following conditions hold for all i ∈ [R]:
where we defineÃ i := A i (ã 1 , . . . ,ã i−1 , β 1 , . . . , β i−1 ) ;
Moreover, ifã and (θ 1 , . . . , θ R ) exist satisfying 1-4 above, then (α, β) is P A -faithful with respect to some valid input X for which the sequence a = (a 1 , . . . , a R ) defined by P A (with respect to X and the sequence β of received messages from Bob) satisfies a =ã.
This claim can be debated using the debate circuit Λ R from Lemma 14. We let Ξ R output 0 if Player 1 loses this debate; thus, we may assume in what follows that Player 1 supplies the true value of D lex (r) (β 1 , . . . , β i−1 ). Next, the circuit Ξ R asks Player 1 to provide a description of a vertex v, in the form of a path h ∈ {0, 1} ≤T such that v = vertex(∅; h). The implicit claim by Player 1 is that v = v(Ã i ). Player 0 is then given an opportunity to dispute the value v provided. There are two ways v could fail to equal v(Ã i ): either some edge e along the path h does not lie inÃ i , or some child-edge e of v lies inÃ i . Player 0 claims one of these two options hold; in either case, he specifies the relevant edge e = edge(∅; h ) in the form of a path h that is either a subpath of h, or extends h by a single step. (That h has this form can easily be checked by an O(R)-sized circuit.) Using the definitioñ
and the assumed fact that Player 1 has provided the true value of D lex (r) (β 1 , . . . , β i−1 ), the two players may debate whether edge(∅; h ) ∈Ã i using the debate circuit Ψ R from Lemma 15.
(If h is a subpath of h, Player 0 must argue e = edge(∅; h ) / ∈Ã i ; if h extends h, Player 0 must argue e ∈Ã i . Depending on which case we are in, we assign debater roles in Ψ R accordingly.)
If Player 0 successfully defends the claim that v = v(Ã i ), then we let Ξ R output 0. Thus we may assume in what follows that Player 1 provides the true value v = v(Ã i ), and successfully defends his claim.
Recall that θ i ∈ {0, 1}, so Player 1 must argue that case 2 or 3 in the definition of a i holds when we evaluate a i Ã i ,ã 1 , . . . ,ã i−1 , θ i . Ifã i = "<", Player 1 must argue that case 2 holds; otherwise Player 1 must argue that case 3 holds, and Player 0 is given an opportunity to argue that, on the contrary, case 2 holds. In either case, one of the two players must argue that case 2 holds, so we will just describe the alternative where Player 1 must argue that case 2 holds (the other alternative is handled similarly with roles reversed).
To argue that case 2 holds in the definition of a i , and that a i =ã i , Player 1 is asked to provide the strings w, w ∈ {0, 1} * from case 2. These strings can be restricted to have length O(log R), since the descriptions produced by desc are of length O(log R), so the claim that w is a prefix of w can be checked directly by Ξ R , and the claim thatã 1 , . . . ,ã i−1 is of form (u, <, w) can be easily debated. Ξ R outputs 0 if Player 1 loses either of these tests, so we may assume the Player 1 provides w honestly and a w extending w.
Next, Ξ R checks whether w = desc(( , s)) for some ( , s) ∈ Π, and if so stores the values , s. This can be done efficiently since w is of length O(log R) and we're using a "reasonable" encoding desc. So we may assume the w Player 1 provides is such a valid description, if this is possible. Now Player 1 must argue that condition (b) in case 2 of the definition of a i holds for w, w . In the case where v(Ã i ) is the root of T , it is easy to decide whether condition (b) holds. Otherwise, Player 1 must argue that e, the θ i -outgoing edge of v(Ã i ), is a descendant of e j− = e j− (ã 1 , . . . ,ã i−1 ), with e j− ∈ X and e = edge(e j− ; s). This can be debated using our circuit Ψ R from Lemma 15. If Player 1 loses this debate, Ξ R will immediately output 0; thus, Player 1 can pass this part of the debate iff case 2 of the definition of a i holds, for his chosen pair w, w . We may assume that if case 2 holds, Player 1 chooses w, w correctly and defends his choice successfully.
Finally, we let Ξ R output 1 exactly ifã i extends w according to w (or, in the case w = w , Ξ R outputs 1 iffã i = ">"). Thus, in the event that Player 1 must argue (truthfully) that case 2 in the definition of a i holds, then Player 1 can win iffã i = a i Ã i ,ã 1 , . . . ,ã i−1 , θ i . On the other hand, Player 1 cannot win if he claims falsely that case 2 in the definition of a i holds. As mentioned earlier, the case where Player 0 is arguing that case 2 holds is handled similarly. This proves correctness of Ξ R . Also, by construction, Ξ R is of size O(R) and has O(1) debate-blocks.
Proof of Lemma 11
We are finally ready to prove our main technical lemma from Section 5.1, Lemma 11.
Proof of Lemma 11. The debate circuit Φ BR = Φ BR,ε T operates in three phases, as follows:
Phase 1: In this phase, the players use the debate circuits to debate whether C (r) : Γ ≤R → F p is a tree code of distance ≥ 1 − ε. For this, Player 0 is asked to supply a pair u, v of some equal length k ≤ R. The implicit claim is that u, v form a counterexample to the tree code distance property (defined in Section 4.6).
Player 0 is also asked to supply the index i ≤ k on which he claims u, v first differ. This claim can easily be debated (by a circuit of size O(R)) using Lemma 12, part (i). If Player 0 lies and is caught, Φ BR will immediately output 1; thus, we may assume Player 0 truthfully supplies the correct value i. From this, the circuit can easily compute the quantity (u, v) from Section 4.6.
Next, Player 1 supplies w, w for which he claims C(u) = w, C(v) = w . The players use the debate circuit Φ = Φ R from Lemma 13 to debate this claim. If Player 1 loses this debate, Φ BR will immediately output 0, so we may assume the values w, w are correct and defended successfully by Player 1. Φ BR then uses Lemma 12, part (iii) to compute ∆(w, w ). If ∆(w, w ) < (1 − ε) (u, v), then Φ BR immediately outputs 0; otherwise we move on to Phase 2. (Φ BR can store the dyadic rational value ε for this use.) By construction, Player 1 can avoid losing in Phase 1 iff C (r) is a tree code of distance 1 − ε.
Phase 2: In this phase, the players debate whether (α, β) is P A = P A [r]-faithful (we suppress the dependence on r in our notation). To this end, Player 1 first provides sequences a = (ã 1 , . . . ,ã R ) ∈ Γ R , θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ R ) ∈ Γ R . His first implicit claim, to be debated in Phase 2, is that conditions 1-4 in Lemma 20 hold forã, θ and for all i ∈ [R]. His second claim, to be debated in Phase 3, is that for the input X guaranteed to exist forã by Lemma 20, we have Eval A (X, α, β) = edge(∅; h).
First, Player 0 is given the opportunity to give an i 0 ∈ [R] and a c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} for which he claims condition c in Lemma 20 fails for i = i 0 .
If c = 1, Player 0's claim can be debated using the circuit Φ R from Lemma 13. If c = 2, the claim can be debated using the circuit Ξ R from Lemma 21. If c ∈ {3, 4}, the claim is easily debated once we can establish the value of v(Ã i ). We have already described (in the proof of Lemma 21) how the players may debate to determine v(Ã i ).
If Player 0 successfully defends his claim specified by (i 0 , c), Φ BR immediately outputs 0; otherwise we move on to Phase 3. Thus under optimal play, Player 1 can pass through Phase 2 without losing iff there is a pairã, θ for which conditions 1-4 of Lemma 20 hold for all i. By that Lemma, such a pair exists iff (α, β) is P A -faithful with respect to some input X for which a =ã.
Phase 3: In this phase, the players debate whether Eval A (X, α, β) = vertex(∅; h) for the X guaranteed to exist forã by Lemma 20. Recall that Eval A (X, α, β) = v(A R ), where A R is as defined by (a 1 , . . . , a R , β 1 , . . . , β R ) = (ã, β) in Eq. (1). We showed in the proof of Lemma 21 how the players can debate to determine v(A R ). We reapply that debate; Player 1 is named the winner by Φ BR iff Player 1 successfully defends the claim that v(A R ) = vertex(∅; h).
Thus, Player 1 can win the debate Φ BR iff C (r) is a tree code of distance ≥ 1 − ε and (α, β) is P A -faithful with respect to some input X for which Eval A (X, α, β) = vertex(∅; h), as desired. Finally, Φ BR has O(1) debate-blocks by construction, and is of size O(R).
Conclusion
There are several possible directions for future work: 1. Can our probabilistically checkable debate systems be made even more efficient? Developing good error-correcting codes decodable by linear -sized circuits (improving on the O(n log n)-sized circuits from [Spi96] ) would shave a log factor from our debatestring lengths. If we could do this, then our PCDSs could be made to essentially match the efficiency of the best PCPPs.
2.
In this paper we did not attempt to minimize the increase in the number of turns in our debate transformation. Our approach gives no improvement over [CFLS95] in this respect: both approaches increase the number of turns by a constant factor, if the starting debate has strictly-alternating turns, each consisting of a single bit. If not, the number of turns may increase by a much larger amount.
To our knowledge, there also has been no in-depth study of the number of rounds required for error-resilient communication, when the communication protocol to be simulated lasts a bounded number of rounds (with several bits transmitted per round). Can we make communication error-resilient, while increasing each of the number of rounds and the total communication by only a constant (or at least slowly-growing) factor? The challenging case seems to be when rounds are of variable bitlength. Understanding this question would clarify the situation for PCDSs, and would be of interest in its own right.
3.
Recall that our PCDSs for L are of bitlength nearly-linear in s(n), the circuit size of the verifier for an ordinary debate system for L. We left open whether the PCDS bitlength could be polynomial in the bitlength of the original debate. Can we derive unlikely consequences of this? To explore this, one might try to work by analogy with Fortnow and Santhanam's results on infeasibility of succinct PCPs for SAT [FS11] (see Section 1.4).
4.
As mentioned earlier, the same authors who first built PCDSs in [CFLS95] also showed in [CFLS97] that interactive proofs (i.e., debates between a maximizing Player 1 and a completely random Player 0) can also be made probabilistically checkable. It would be very interesting to know whether this reduction can be carried out with efficiency comparable to our reduction for ordinary debate systems in this paper. This would yield improved conditional hardness statements for the complexity of approximating stochastic sequential optimization problems on CSPs. The difficulty in applying our methods is that we appear to have no effective way to make the random player "follow" the Braverman-Rao protocol.
